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In Pennsylvania, Democrats are 
celebrating a huge win. On Novem-
ber 3, three Democratic candidates 
(Donahue, Dougherty, and Wecht) 
captured seats on the State Supreme 
Court. Judicial elections are com-
mon — 38 states use them to select 
justices for courts at all levels: high 
(Supreme), intermediate appellate, 
and trial.1 Despite their widespread 
use, many rightfully question the 
prudence of using popular elections 
to fill state courts. 
 A key difference between 
federal and state courts is that while 
federal judges are nominated by 
the president and confirmed by the 
Senate, the majority of jurists at the 
state level are elected. The reason 
federal judges, at least judges on the 
Article III courts, are made by ex-
ecutive selection is the same reason 
that Supreme Court justices are giv-
en life tenure: to insulate them from 
the whims of public opinion. In The 
Federalist, Alexander Hamilton ve-
hemently defended the idea of insu-
lating courts from public opinion:
This independence of the 
judges is equally requisite to 
guard the Constitution and the 
rights of individuals from the ef-
fects of those ill humors, which 
the arts of designing men…
sometimes disseminate among 
the people themselves, and 
which, though they speedily give 
place to better information, and 
more deliberate reflection, have 
a tendency, in the meantime, to 
occasion dangerous innovations 
in the government, and serious 
oppressions of the minor party 
in the community.2
In this passage, Hamilton ar-
ticulates the fundamental paradox 
of democracy, a question that gen-
uine republics have always grap-
pled with: how can we control for 
the “tyranny of the majority?” In 
other words, how can we entrust 
people with the power to govern 
themselves but also prevent them 
from stripping away the rights of 
minority groups or from posing a 
danger to others? As a democrat-
ic republic, of course we believe in 
majority rule, so it seems anathema 
to Americans to say there is such a 
thing as too much democracy, but it 
does exist: what the majority wants 
is not always just, which we have 
seen internationally — the Unit-
ed States has more than once been 
forced to backpedal swiftly on the 
international stage away from her 
professed democratic values when 
foreign populations elect what we 
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would term extremists and radicals 
—and domestically, in cases such as 
Brown.
By most standards today, the 
ruling made in Brown v. Board of 
Education to overturn Plessy v. Fer-
guson (the case that originally insti-
tuted the “separate but equal” doc-
trine that Brown reversed) seems 
natural and just. The m a instream 
is virtually empty of any voices that 
contest this ruling. Though the atti-
tudes supplanted by Brown v. Board 
have now given way to “better in-
formation, and more deliberate re-
flection,” i t i s i mportant t o remem-
ber the infamous black-and-white 
snapshots of protesters toting signs 
like Race Mixing is Communism; 
We wont [sic] go to school with 
Negroes; and Communist Jews Be-
hind Race-Mixing that summed up 
Brown’s Southern reception. We 
need to remember the iconic imag-
es of the Little Rock Nine walking to 
school surrounded by the National 
Guard and the photo of Elizabeth 
Eckford walking away from a crowd 
of jeering whites and ask ourselves 
seriously if state laws prohibiting in-
tegration and so-called “miscegena-
tion” would have been overruled if 
the Supreme Court were dependent 
on those protesters for reelection. 
The r ight d ecision m ay b e d ifficult 
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and unpopular. It’s imperative to our 
country’s health that we have justices 
who can make these difficult deci-
sions without having to fear for their 
jobs. 
This is no problem confined to the 
“old days” of segregation. Because of 
their vulnerability to the whims of the 
public, in the last few years a num-
ber of judges have been threatened 
with impeachment for striking down 
bans on same-sex marriage. After the 
Court ruled this summer to uphold 
the legality of same-sex marriage and 
certain clauses of the Affordable Care 
Act, a number of conservative com-
mentators, among them presidential 
candidate Ted Cruz, a self-professed 
constitutionalist, called for elections 
to be implemented for Supreme 
Court. “Sadly, the Court’s hubris and 
thirst for power have reached un-
precedented levels,” he said. That a 
justice should face losing his or her 
job for the heinous crime of return-
ing a verdict distasteful to some of 
his or her constituents debases our 
legal system. 
Iconic civil rights cases like 
Brown which, while they are vast in 
impact come but rarely, are not the 
most pressing concern to opponents 
of judicial elections. The troubling ef-
fects of judicial elections on criminal 
law enforcement can be seen every 
day. Most voters, unaware of the finer 
points of Constitutional law, may not 
recognize, for example, that it is often 
necessary for judges to examine the 
conduct of law enforcement officers. 
When the police overreach, some-
times the only redress is to suppress 
evidence — including evidence that 
incriminates an actually guilty de-
fendant — or even to dismiss charges 
completely. These types of decisions 
are deeply unpopular. The hope is 
that federal judges, who are selected 
by the people’s representatives in-
stead of the people themselves, will 
be better able to retain their objectiv-
ity in the face of strong public oppo-
sition. But judges elected for specific 
terms, who must run for re-election, 
or at least retention, have shown 
themselves to be more vulnerable to 
the passions of an inflamed public. In 
election years especially, a judge, be-
ing keener than ever to avoid earning 
the abhorred title of “soft on crime,” 
hands down decisions with one eye 
turned towards his or her reelection 
bid: a 2012 study from Berkeley sug-
gested that judges rule more harshly 
on violent crimes in election years, 
with as much as a 10 percent increase 
in sentence length.3 
Thomas Jefferson said, “When 
one undertakes to administer jus-
tice, it must be with an even hand, 
and by rule; what is done for one, 
must be done for everyone in equal 
degree.”4 This call for levelheaded 
jurisprudence seems to conflict with 
the realities of our current electoral 
system. In addition to making public 
opinion a misplaced concern, elec-
tions force judges to grovel for funds, 
potentially indebting themselves to 
groups that have an interest in future 
cases. In general, the fairness of our 
current system of campaign finance 
is something political scientists are 
currently pondering at all levels of 
government. As the cost of mount-
ing a competitive election increases 
drastically, candidates have come to 
rely more and more on contributions 
from the private sector. In the last 
few years it has been the subject of 
several high-profile Supreme Court 
cases because of fears that it allows 
a few heavy spenders to drown out 
the majority. This is less than ideal 
for any position but is particular-
ly concerning for jurists, who are 
meant to be impartial interpreters of 
the law. More than just harsher rul-
ings for criminals, when we pit judi-
cial candidates against each other in 
elections, we force them to court do-
nors who may have less than pristine 
motivations. According to Shepherd 
and Kang of Emory University, 76 
percent of voters believe that cam-
paign contributions have some effect 
on shaping judicial rulings, and 46 
percent of judges themselves believe 
contributions have “at least a little” 
influence.5
The views outlined in Federalist 
No. 78, that popular elections would 
compromise the integrity of the ju-
diciary, were widely accepted for a 
number of years, making elected ju-
diciaries the exception rather than 
the norm. The ascendency of Andrew 
Jackson, however, popularized new 
and comparatively liberal views on 
democracy — the term Jacksonian 
democracy was coined to describe the 
increased participation of the gener-
al public in government seen during 
his presidency. This change includ-
ed a shift away from appointed, to-
wards elected, justices. On the face of 
things, this was a sensible measure to 
enact; the shift was a reform, an ear-
nest attempt to keep the democratic 
procedure open and free. As scholar 
David Pozen writes, “Elections bring 
[judiciaries] into the sphere of ordi-
nary politics, inviting voters to con-
ceptualize the individuals selected 
as agents and representatives rather 
than autonomous actors or distant 
technocrats. They invite voters to 
think about the  substantive powers 
of that institution, and whether they 
would like to see those powers wield-
ed differently.”6 Unfortunately, the 
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view Pozen takes is sadly optimistic. 
It assumes, falsely, an ideal political 
environment, where most citizens 
are well-informed and active in the 
democratic process. Even during 
presidential elections, turnout is less 
than ideal; according to The Center 
for Voting and Democracy, 60 per-
cent of eligible people participate, 
and for midterm and off-year elec-
tions, participation drops to just 40 
percent.7
 People unfamiliar with do-
mestic politics tend to be leery of 
appointed justices, who seem to have 
an alarming amount of power cou-
pled with minimal accountability. 
The impulse to make judges more 
responsive to the people whose lives 
are governed by their decisions is a 
sympathetic one, but a position on 
the bench is unlike any other polit-
ical office. Unlike legislative officials 
who craft laws to suit their constit-
uents, a justice is asked at the time 
of his or her inauguration to affirm 
that their first duty is to uphold the 
Constitution. They are occasionally 
thrust into the position of de facto 
legislator, and thus many citizens im-
pulsively want to tighten the reigns 
through judicial elections. This is a 
dilemma that certainly deserves fur-
ther discussion, but by using judicial 
elections, we force officials to choose 
between upholding their duty and 
keeping their livelihoods. Even then 
it doesn’t produce the desired results. 
Apathy and stagnation in the politi-
cal system have made them less the 
vehicle for upholding popular con-
stitutionalism e than an opportunity 
for undue influence by a wealthy few.
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